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from strain may be great when he realizes that this individual life need not even be fashioned into something which looks finished and intelligible on its own account; that the Spirit may conceivably use it best by breaking it into pieces, by dividing it among distracting interests, and filling the spaces with details which have really no significance except as interpreted with regard to quite other lives. In so far as he is in no way religious, the self-conscious moral man must try to make a good thing of his own life; the religious man need not. The kingdom of the Middle Saxons, to justify and explain itself, must make a clear and well-composed history of its own, a thread distinguishable in the skein. Modern London, with a far richer self-consciousness, may be content with an unwritable story, without plot or connection or climax, beginning or end, wound and buried beyond any tracing in the vast web of the history of England. Practical philosophy, then, relaxes the tensions round the objective division lines, and religion those round the subjective. The lines then cease to be attempts to fashion the universe on opposite plans, and become, as they should be, mere guides to different ways of looking at it. By natural expansion of this view, the conflict between the saint and the zealous worker disappears. Each life and each objective interest falls into its place in the ideal life of the universe, where *natura naturans* and *natura naturata*, variously patterned, are still only the two sides of the shield.

HELEN WODEHOUSE.

UNIVERSITY OF BIRMINGHAM.

IS BELIEF ESSENTIAL IN RELIGION?

BY HORACE M. KALLEN.

THAT religion, next to hunger and love, has been one of the most potent molds of human character and human destiny is a truism so obvious as to be profound.

Professional religionists harp upon it in modern apologetic; the sentimental see in it a reason for identifying their accidental fads and private loyalties with religious excellence, the tough-minded take it as their warrant for the complete rejection of religion from the life of reason. It rarely occurs to ask, in this agreement on importance in the midst of the disagreement concerning value, whether the disputants are also agreed on the nature of their subject or the central theme of their dispute. Yet one cannot help suspecting profound and irreconcilable differences between the eternal religion of Pius X and the 'religion of the future' of Charles W. Eliot, between the religion of the Australian blackfellow and the religion of Abbé Loisy. The systematic or sporadic extension of the environment through imaginal extrapolations like gods, angels, saints, and demons is a far cry from the perfervid pietism, the passionate humanism, or vague 'loyalty to the good' of 'morality tinged with emotion.' Currently both these extremes have been emphasized. On the one hand, the papacy, with no uncertain voice, has reaffirmed the supernaturalism of historic religious tradition; on the other, the modernists, whether Loisy or Eliot, have affirmed just as certainly the naturalistic faith in the happy destiny of all men. One party insists that the essence of religion is the presence and efficacious operation, in this our world, of supernatural personalities; the other defines the essence of religion as belief.

To determine which of these definitions is correct would task any moralist, concerned about the instruments of life in its struggle for happiness. Religion has been a tool second to none in its potency for good and evil, and its valuation for future use must depend considerably on its character and functional outcome. To ask, then, what is essential in religion, is to put a question pregnant with moral consequences.

If popular and literary usage be a sanction, belief must be considered the essential element in religion. The terms

religion, loyalty, faith, and belief have for generations been used interchangeably. Wherever faith occurs, wherever there is prominent a devotion or a loyalty deep and unswerving, toward *any* object, that loyalty or belief may be identified with religion. This is particularly the case where the object believed in is held to be an omniscient for the world's ills, where there is attributed to it a universal and instantaneous potency, either remedial or mutative. We hear, therefore, of such objects as the 'religion of socialism,' 'of science,' 'of beauty,' 'of love,' 'of humanity,' 'of might.' In each case some dominant motive or program of conduct is acclaimed an object of religious faith or is assigned an almost miraculous prepotency in the subjugation of evil and the conservation and creation of excellence. Of programs of social reform or ethical doctrines this is particularly characteristic, since in these some single dogma or principle or term is believed in, first for its (hypothetical) exclusive power in achieving and maintaining some desired end, then for itself. Dr. Eliot's 'religion of the future' is a highly generalized adumbration of the more concrete current 'religions' of social alterations. Religion is, from this point of view, as Professor Perry writes, "belief on the part of individuals or communities concerning the final or overruling control of their interests;" and "the term God signifies not the environment in its inherent nature, but the environment in its bearing on the worshiper's interests."¹

If it be true that in religion we mean by God a practical interpretation of the world, *whatsoever* be its nature, then the personality of God must be a derivative of the attitude and not of the nature of the world. . . . My God is my world practically recognized in respect to its fundamental or ultimate attitude to my ideals. . . . To be religious is to believe that a certain correlation of forces, moral and factual, is in reality operative and that it determines the propriety and effectiveness of a certain type of living.²

¹ "The Moral Justification of Religion," *Harvard Theological Review*, Vol. II, No. 2, pp. 163, 167.

² "Approach to Philosophy," pp. 109, 97.

Here what is important is not the object believed *in*, but the attitude of belief. A Godless religion, as various commentators on Mr. Eliot's paper show, is as 'religious' as a religion with a whole Catholic hierarchy. In point of fact, the word 'God' is robbed of its essential function of standing any longer for an independent, objective, existent supernatural personality. Tradition, orthodoxy, and instinctive sense, as well as professional theologians, would insist that the important element in religion is not *belief*, but the *object* believed in,—the supernatural personality, God. Contemporary religious piety may be apportioned between two classes, the one identifying the essence of religion with belief or piety, with the psychological attitude, the other identifying it with the specific object or occasion of the attitude, supernatural personality.

To determine which of these parties is right lies far beyond the scope of this paper. All that can here be done is to suggest the main lines that such an investigation would need to follow. The principle to be laid down as the major premise is the obvious and hence unremembered one that things are definable only in so far as they *differ* from other things, not in so far as they are identical with those things. Thus, when some philosopher announces, "The world is idea," he equates 'idea' with all objects actual or possible, and robs it of its function and meaning. Where everything is equally 'idea,' nothing in particular is more 'idea' than any other thing, and it becomes necessary to invent a new term for that particular and different entity which 'idea' was formerly used to define. So again, if religion and belief or religion and belief in supernatural personal agencies are interchangeable, it either must be true that one or both of these terms characterizes 'religion' absolutely, differentiating it from all other objects such as science or art, or that religion and one of the other terms are absolutely equivalent and exhaust each other. We must find what it is, in the complex called religion, that makes and keeps it *that* and not something else.

I have just called religion a complex. I know that much protestant and modernist and generally liberal feeling will rebel against this characterization. It is fashionable nowadays to apply 'religion' to any favored or cherished state of mind or to call it indefinable and unutterable. But it is nevertheless a fact that historical religions are not indefinable or unutterable. If they were, they could not be *historical*. And whatever be the religion of the future, present-day religions are deep-rooted in history and thinkable in its terms. Consider the very simplest or most complex form of the religion most familiar to western civilization, Christianity. Whether as Unitarianism or as Catholicism, we find it to have definite namable parts and concrete functions. These we may call science or cosmology, ethics, art, and belief. All religions, primitive or sophisticated, contain these four elements. Their specific content may differ, but their function, which defines them, is the same. Science or cosmology is a vision of the nature and character of the universe; ethics is a formulation of the rules of adaptation to that universe; art is the specific business of adaptation, the application of the rules; belief, of which we shall have much more to say, is the underlying human attitude without which the rest of the business could not occur.

Now when we consider the 'science' of religion, we find it possibly identical with what is ordinarily called science, but differing at least in the one particular that the whole object of unreligious science is made dependent on the will and attitude of at least one supernatural personality, or is identified therewith. This is the case in Unitarianism. Where the divine is not so denumerate or diaphanous and the cosmology is different, we still find the object of science, the world, dependent on a whole hierarchy of supernatural personalities, demons, saints, angels, thrones, dominations, and principalities, all these ultimately dependent on God. Such is the case in Catholicism. In un-Christian religions the nature of religious

cosmology is still more obvious. It differs in every case from unreligious cosmology or science in its using at least one additional factor, supernatural personality.

The same thing is true when we distinguish religious from unreligious ethics. The two differ often solely in the fact that one has not a supernatural or magical sanction, while the other has. The taboos and categorical implications are religious when they are said to voice the desires and mandates of supernatural beings, and where their infraction involves penalties arising from the displeasure of the supernatural. They are, in a word, rules of *adaptation to the supernatural through the medium of nature*. Catholicism, with its clear and distinct cosmic system, its inferno, purgatory, and paradise, its supernatural sanctions and impositions, its peculiar system of virtues and vices, is an obvious and magnificent example of this. But Unitarianism, vague though it is, does not fail of it, nor does any religion, whatever its anthropological status.

Religious art is logically the direct outcome of religious cosmology and religious ethics. Its primary function is to render solid and concrete the imaginative extension of nature made by religious science. It gives the supernatural a local habitation and a name, a point of contact with nature. That point of contact may be an image, a rite, a ceremony. Whatever else it be, it is man's concrete instrument of adaptation to the supernatural. The *Ave* goes better *via* the image of Mary just as *mana* goes better *via* crystals or dead ancestor's bones. The Arunta on the plateaus of Australia, solemnly partaking of his totemic kangaroo on the eve of his hunting expedition, the Christian in Rome, partaking of the sacrament on the eve of some enterprise real or determined by the saints' calendar, are both, by an organized method, adapting themselves to the supernatural, are getting it on their side. Religious art may be symbolic, it may be magical; but there is no one form of it, anywhere, which, if really religious, is not a tool in adapting mankind to the super-

natural. And it is in this fact, and in this fact alone, that its difference from other forms of art consists.

Thus religion as science, as ethics, as art differs from what is ordinarily denoted by these terms by considering an additional single or multiform factor,—supernatural personality. There seems, so far, little reason for identifying religion exclusively with belief. Nor is there any greater justification therefor in the nature of belief itself.

According to Perry, "the believing experience is cognitive in intent, but practical and emotional as well in content, . . . the object of my belief is not merely known, but also felt and acted upon. *What I believe expresses itself in my total experience.*"³ This is a fair summary. Every belief, even the simplest, is a complex thing. It is composed of at least two diverse elements, and, as in the ordinary beliefs of the daily life, may contain any number of these elements. They may be broadly divided into the *objects* of belief and the *attitude* of belief. The object may be anything, no matter what,—mind-stuff, will, mud, cobwebs, stardust, fairies, bread, or policemen. To the psychologist it may be a dream, a hallucination, a mere figment of the diseased mind which believes it. To that mind, however, it is acutely real, independent of his belief in it, evocative of the believing attitude. No belief, not even a false one, is a belief in nothing. However arisen, and of whatever stuff created, in each belief an object is given, the occasion of its appropriate attitude. Now the character of that attitude varies with its object, not in nature, but in intensity. Its nature is that of practical assent to the object. It is an acknowledgment, a recognition or acceptance, of the object's status. It is invariably a positive, immediate, and definitive reaction to the object, wherever that be and whatever its seat.

The converse of this attitude is not what is called 'disbelief,' denial, for that is merely a complex form of belief. When I 'disbelieve' in ghosts I am not altering the

³ "Approach to Philosophy," p. 58.

nature of ghosts, I am simply assigning them a different status, I am making them move, let us say, from the realm of existence to that of ideas, but their nature remains unchanged. The converse of belief is doubt or agnosticism, and this is not really an attitude, but a contradiction or conflict of attitudes,—properly so, since the opposite of attitude cannot be *an* attitude. Doubt may be defined as an inner maladjustment corresponding to a struggle of events, whether ideal or existential, for place. It denotes physical and psychic instability. It is a division of the mind against itself in a diremption of attention, and is hence a menace against the continuity and articulation of life. It involves inaction or conflicting actions, as the life of the ‘doubters’ in literature suggests, and at its intensest does actually break up the organic equilibrium of consciousness. For this reason doubt, agnosticism, or scepticism are actually never more than very ephemeral conditions of the spirit. They are suicidal. Our world is such that any defined or definable object either makes a pragmatic difference in it or does not. If it does, something positive is, by that fact, obviously believed of it; if it does not, its status is *ipso facto* positively defined, though perhaps not so obviously. In either case, no doubt enters the definitive attitude. That is possible only if the absence or presence of the pragmatic difference remains uncounted and ignored, but then also, life is arrested and ultimately destroyed. Belief, therefore, is inevitable.

An example will make this point clearer. And fortunately religion offers the best. Agnostics and skeptics conceive themselves to be actually holding: “I do not know whether God exists or not.” This proposition is intended to express the state of ‘doubt.’ Now to have meaning, it must, like all other propositions, contain terms that in themselves are not only undoubted, but are also significant. If our agnostic does not know *what* God is, and *what* existence is, and if he does not believe that each is *that* ‘what’ and not another, his statement is mere

nonsense. Doubt presupposes and depends upon belief.

Of beliefs, the most important, it need not be argued, are those which assert the *existence* of their objects. An existent *must* be counted, recognized, reacted to according to its nature and proper requirements, while a non-existent in the same field of belief is relatively negligible. The non-existent requires the minimum of reaction; the existent the maximum. So, for example, in the field of belief called this room there are actual tables and chairs and a hypothetical fire. With regard to the former I must guard my movements and adapt my actions. I may not handle them with impunity; I must recognize and defer to their characters and demands if they are to serve my purposes or I am to live among them. But the fire I may do as I like with. I must recognize its identity, but I can sit on it, carry it in my hands, breathe it, scatter it,—do an infinite number of things with it I should not dare to do with an *existing* fire. Existence, while not altering its character or identity, would give it the quality of command, would make it *count* potently. Thus existence alters, not things, but the importance of things for mankind.

The situation with regard to the object God in the proposition, 'God exists,' is now evident. A non-existent God is not an unreal or characterless one. A non-existent God is an unimportant one, one that makes no pragmatic difference in man's life of adaptation. So then, the proposition, 'I do not know whether God exists,' may with perfect justice be interpreted as, 'I do not know how to conduct myself toward an object, God, in my total environment.' In this form the agnostic proposition indicates either continual inaction, or contradictory actions, on the part of those who hold it. And in this instance it must be life-long, since God is by definition such, that if he exists, he must be counted with at every moment of human life. But agnostics have none of them been inert and few of them inconsistent. They must therefore either have believed or denied the proposition, 'God exists,' but

they never for any time really doubted it. Their 'I do not know whether God exists' is better interpreted as a historical summary of three attitudes, which may be expressed thus: (1) Sometimes I act toward God as an existent and sometimes I act toward God as a non-existent; (2) I do treat God as an existent; (3) I do treat God as a non-existent.

Of these, the first is probably commonest. It indicates, as do the other two, that, for the affair of living, God at any moment must be believed to exist or to not exist, but that there is no middle way. Thus, in religion at least, belief, positive or negative, is inevitable. That it is just as inevitable in all realms of life would be easy enough to prove in detail. But for the purposes of this discussion the foregoing brief exposition must suffice.

The upshot is that the mere presence of any entity, whatever its status, evokes at once the believing attitude. Life is no more than a flux of beliefs, a movement from one equilibrium of faith to another. And in this movement the attitude is unvarying, it is only the objects that vary, jostling and pushing each other for place in the whirl of experience, challenging each other's right to be and jumping each other's claims. The successful one determines belief; *it* and not the attitude determines the character of the belief. To be religious, belief must contain a religious object,—*i. e.*, supernatural personality, particularly God. Here again, it is the object, not the intrinsic character of the attitude itself, which makes belief religious. Belief, like science, ethics, and art becomes religious only when attached to the religious object, God. That is the essential thing.

This being the case, it becomes of more than passing interest to determine the grounds for the very widespread identification of belief with religion, an identification, grown almost into the texture of our human speech. The root of the matter will be found in the popular distinction between belief and knowledge. Belief seems to have reference to the element of menace and challenge

which appears to fall to the share of so many objects in the universe. A man 'believes' when he is not sure, when the object may be different. He 'knows' when change in the object is, to his mind at least, out of question. This means no difference in nature between belief and knowledge; it means merely that the equilibrium of faith is not sufficiently stable nor adequately assured. The object of belief has not, for the believer, so firm a footing in the environment as the object of knowledge. At bottom, $2 + 2 = 4$, and *God exists* are both beliefs, but *God exists*, it seems, is not so capable of maintaining itself in the environmental flux. In their primary intention belief and knowledge are identical. It is only by the very process of life, by the unbroken activity of believing, that they become differentiated, and knowledge attains the signification of valid and firmly established propositions, while belief refers to shaky ones, with claims unsubstantiated and places still to earn. Knowledge is fit belief; belief is knowledge with its fitness still to prove.

If, then, religion is called belief, it is not so called because it is useful, or has practical reference, or is possessed of any of the other properties assigned to it by Perry. Religion is called belief because it has its fitness still to prove, because its object has not yet really found a place in the efficacious world. This may be seen in three directions, one looking from the immateriality of God, another from the doubtfulness of his presence where his presence is imputed, and the final one from the infinite number of alternatives to his power.

Immateriality, far from being a good thing as is popularly supposed, is a bad thing. Common sense has a very ancient and deep-rooted tendency to identify all immaterialities but the religious ones, with the non-existent and the unreal. It is notable, in this connection, that all religious objects were once material, and that in our own time the most long-lived and deep-rooted religions, like Catholicism, make use of the greatest number of material objects. Unless God has a material manifestation he

does not much matter. Now all in all, this manifestation is rare and difficult to find. Some delicate souls identify it with the order or design in the universe; some, indeed most, with coincidences and chance happenings which habit does not sanction, with magic and miracle,—*i. e.*, with the interruption and distortion of design. The conflict of these identifications raises inevitably a social doubt which could not have occurred had God been material, *i. e.*, had a definite cognizable, indisputable form, like man or chair. In consequence much of the authority of religion depends on the testimony of persons who have seen God *in propria persona*, in a direct intuition or perception, just as we ordinarily see chairs and the rest of the environment. Medicine-men, priests, prophets, saints, and mystics are the supporters and renovators of human faith in the religious object, and the mystical religious experience is the *fons et origo* of the life of religious faith. And what is the religious experience? It is an interruption of the organized routine of the daily life, and even those who defend it recognize it as a breaking up and disintegration of the normal consciousness. In it the ordinary world disappears. To the psychologist, what takes its place is that complex of somatic and proprioceptive sensations which the needs of the daily life keep submerged. These appear now to fill the focus of consciousness, acutely pleasurable or painful, and about them in the first stage of ecstasy, there seems to gyrate a nimbus or fringe of visual or auditory elements organized in a variety of ways. In the second stage, these may subside and a very vivid sense of 'presence' may take their place; or they may intensify, the huddle of them may become dominated by one or two exceedingly energetic visual or auditory hallucinations about which there grows a massive, optimal emotional complex wherein fear and elation alternate and by which the complex may be defined. The total field of consciousness is vague and indefinitely emotional, all the while shot through with sharply defined hallucinations of the higher senses. In

a word, the psychologist need see in the mystic or religious experience nothing more than the shattering of the whole laborious machinery of perception and the reduction of life to its almost protoplasmic inchoateness of feeling and movement. The experience is not, for the psychologist, religious *by itself alone*, since he finds all of its criteria wherever, for any reason, there is a disintegration of the normal conscious life. The causes may be drugs, disease, physical fear, great emotional strain,—anything that breaks down the reasonable habits of the soul. When so caused, it is considered anti-social. Religion, however, which produces it in its practices, sanctions and socializes it, and it hence becomes appropriated to religion. Occurring wherever sense shatters habit and ‘pure’ feeling dominates and inhibits the natural interpretation of sense, *its most obvious and immediate content, the emotional complex, is apprehended as a manifestation of God, because it is itself most conspicuous in an environment and a practice which has reference to God as an element.* Thus the *material* object of the religious experience is as likely to be merely psychological as existential, and there is no description of it which cannot with all fairness and with greater ease be interpreted as mental abnormality.

This one alternative admits, of course, of many others. Its possibility rests on the very immateriality of God; and it is that which might be called the source of the uncertainty of his presence and of the alternatives to his efficacy. The religious experience cannot exclusively point to the religious object as its cause. Give it an intellectual and social environment other than religious, say mathematical, and custom may decide its phenomena to be, as they well can, exclusively mathematical. What, in the case of the mystical experience, is of the uttermost importance, is not the experience, for its content, as we have seen, is decidedly dubious. What is important is the interpretation of the experience, the judgment concerning its cause and origin. It is the postulation here of an inde-

pendent, supernatural efficacious personality that makes the mystical experience religious. But that postulation is generally made *after* the fact, and for definite empirical reasons. This makes it uncertain, and the uncertainty is further intensified by the existence of many rival interpretations. Wherever God is said to be or to be efficacious, something natural might be said to be or to serve just as well. He seems, as Laplace said, a hypothesis of which there is no need. He seems a violation of the law of parsimony. It is the vision of this inadequacy of the proof of the existence of the divine object and the failure of intuition to discover or exhibit him that is responsible for that branch of theological activity called apologetics. Apologetics is the symbol of vital and intellectual inadequacy. Thus it is the vagueness and uncertainty of its object that in religion makes belief so conspicuous.

The subconscious motive of such 'religions of the future,' as described by Dr. Eliot, and such interpretations of religion as Perry's, is largely the rationalistic one of eliminating the need of apologetic, of making religion stand firmly on its own feet. Now it is true that by emphasizing the attitude rather than the object of a belief, much is gained in the way of firmness, since no element of uncertainty need unnecessarily be admitted. But it is perforce gained at the cost of some perversion and insincerity. Insincerity is inevitable because religion becomes, in the case of intelligent believers, a *pathetic fallacy* of which they are aware. Actually their religion is Godless, and they know they are calling that God which is not God. And the perversion comes in the destruction of a genuine and necessary distinction by identifying belief with the object of belief. Then a belief that Mars is inhabited, that the solar system is menaced by a comet, is of exactly the same status as a belief in God. The defining element is the attitude, not the object, and the attitude is the same in all fields of human endeavor.

Here, then, is an anomalous situation. The religion of common sense identifies itself as belief because of its

object's uncertainty, the belief being more intense as its object grows more insecure, while the religion of rationalism identifies itself as belief because it seeks to free religion from uncertainty and challenge. One is 'belief' because it clings to God, the other is 'belief' because it abandons God. That the latter is more in keeping with the spirit of the time I shall not attempt to deny. I choose rather to indicate that the former is more in keeping with the spirit of man. To cling to God in the face of his inability to maintain himself in existence is more human than to abandon him. To the human spirit God is intrinsically the most congenial of all essences. He is like ourselves in nature; the very devil is like ourselves in nature. We are at home with these personalities as we cannot be with rigid physical laws and systems; God and the devils and angels stir us as nothing else not human can. They are referred to an environment in which occur, as we have noted, very intense affectional complexes, perhaps the intensest accorded to human experience. And in this environment alone are these complexes socially respectable. Moreover, they are generally referable to moral crises antecedent or consequent. They arise on the pressure of great need, on the intensity of aspiration, on the feeling of depression and sin. They are associated with salvation therefrom. Psychologically, they are themselves that salvation,—the soul's mode of purging itself of spiritual invasions. But in social discourse they only reveal salvation. The power to grant it and the immutable will to grant it are fundamental attributes of God. Whatever the status of the evil principle, the devil, in the end God, the principle of excellence, is the sole and victorious arbiter of universal fate. All religions, from the naïve instrumental spiritism of the Australian blackfellow to the sophisticated instrumentalism of Christian dogmatics, represent the religious objects as ultimately good, as conservative of whatever values, private or communal, there happen to be posited in that organic equilibrium we call life. The most obvious illus-

tration of this fact is the universality with which the most fundamental value of all,—immortality, the continuity of life itself,—is referred to religion and not to science. Religion, as Höffding somewhere points out, is primarily an instrument in the conservation of values. Had experience not perennially challenged them, or had the emotional outburst been all-sufficient, there would have been no place for belief as opposed to knowledge, and for religion as opposed to science. Science is no less instrumental than religion, religion is no less cognitive than science. But religion envisages a world more congenial than the one man actually lives in, a world controlling the actual one and serving to conserve eternally and immediately all the good man ever desired and hoped for. Science, no less than religion, is fundamentally 'belief'; it also symbolizes the self-conserving activity of the 'will-to-live'; but being relevant to the *conditions* of desire, rather than to desire, it is felt as uncongenial and hard and inexorable. Religion, therefore, has over science an apparent advantage; and where an object of science is abandoned on almost any distinct challenge,—as, for example, were the *n*-rays,—the object of religion is clung to in spite of challenge. Religion envisages perennially an object of belief battered and threshed and denied by experience. For this reason the history of religion is fundamentally discontinuous, is a history of protestantisms and rebellions. The 'will-to-live,' in the effort to conserve its values, passes from one instrument to another,—all instruments, in religion, having in common, reference to supernatural personality, prepotent in the conservation of those values. This, the object of religious belief, is held to against evidence to the contrary; and because of the *conspicuity* the attitude gains thereby, religion is identified with belief. Liberals in religion then proceed to claim the conspicuous as the essential.

But conspicuity does not constitute essence. The inhabitants of Mars, a menacing comet, centaurs, moon-calves and goblins and *n*-rays are as infrequent and

hypothetical in direct experience as are God and his emissaries; they are as relevant to conduct and relevant to values, though not as ultimately conservative of them. Undergoing the perennial challenge of experience as they do, belief in them is as conspicuous as belief in God. Yet they are not called religious beliefs, and if they were, it would be impossible to draw the line between belief as religion, as common sense, as superstition, or as science. For all objects believed in undergo challenge and contradiction in some degree, all are relevant to conduct and the conservation of values. Belief, we must conclude, is no more essential to religion than to any other human institution. Religion is distinguished not by belief, but by belief's object,—prepotent, benevolent, supernatural personality, independently existing. Religion is belief indeed, but it is religious belief only as belief in the reality of an actual personal God powerful for the excellent outcome of human destiny.

HORACE M. KALLEN.

HARVARD UNIVERSITY.